| Zeno of Elea |
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Zeno was an Eleatic philosopher, a native of Elea (Velia) in Italy, son of Teleutagoras, and the favorite disciple of Parmenides. He was born about 488 BCE., and at the age of forty accompanied Parmenides to Athens. He appears to have resided some time at Athens, and is said to have unfolded his doctrines to people like Pericles and Callias for the price of 100 minae. Zeno is said to have taken part in the legislation of Parmenides, to the maintenance of which the citizens of Elea had pledged themselves every year by oath. His love of freedom is shown by the courage with which he exposed his life in order to deliver his native country from a tyrant. Whether he died in the attempt or survived the fall of the tyrant is a point on which the authorities vary. They also state the name of the tyranny differently. Zeno devoted all his energies to explain and develop the philosophical system of Parmenides. We learn from Plato that Zeno was twenty-five years younger than Parmenides, and he wrote his defense of Parmenides as a young man. Because only a few fragments of Zeno's writings have been found, most of what we know of Zeno comes from what Aristotle said about him in Physics, Book 6, chapter 9.
Zeno's contribution to Eleatic philosophy is
entirely negative. He did not add anything positive to the teachings
of Parmenides, but devoted himself to refuting the views of the
opponents of Parmenides. Parmenides had taught that the world of
sense is an illusion because it consists of motion (or change) and
plurality (or multiplicity or the many). True Being is absolutely
one; there is in it no plurality. True Being is absolutely static and
unchangeable. Common sense says there is both motion and plurality.
This is the Pythagorean notion of reality against which Zeno directed
his arguments. Zeno showed that the common sense notion of reality
leads to consequences at least as paradoxical as his
master's.
Paradoxes of Multiplicity and Motion
Zeno's arguments can be classified into two groups. The first group contains paradoxes against multiplicity, and are directed to showing that the 'unlimited' or the continuous, cannot be composed of units however small and however many. There are two principal arguments:
Kant's, Hume's, and Hegel's Solutions to Zeno's Paradoxes.
According to Kant, these contradictions are immanent in our conceptions of space and time, so space and time are not real. Space and time do not belong to things as they are in themselves, but rather to our way of looking at things. They are forms of our perception. It is our minds which impose space and time upon objects, and not objects which impose space and time upon our minds. Further, Kant drew from these contradictions the conclusion that to comprehend the infinite is beyond the capacity of human reason. He attempted to show that, wherever we try to think the infinite, whether the infinitely large or the infinitely small, we fall into irreconcilable contradictions.
As might be expected, many thinkers have looked for a way out of the paradoxes. Hume denied the infinite divisibility of space and time, and declared that they are composed of indivisible units having magnitude. But the difficulty that it is impossible to conceive of units having magnitude which are yet indivisible is not satisfactorily explained by Hume.
Hegel believed that any solution which is to be satisfactory must somehow make room for both sides of the contradiction. It will not do to deny one side or the other, to say that one is false and the other true. A true solution is only possible by rising above the level of the two antagonistic principles and taking them both up to the level of a higher conception, in which both opposites are reconciled. Hegel regarded Zeno's paradoxes as examples of the essential contradictory character of reason. All thought, all reason, for Hegel, contains immanent contradictions which it first posits and then reconciles in a higher unity, and this particular contradiction of infinite divisibility is reconciled in the higher notion of quantity. The notion of quantity contains two factors, namely the one and the many. Quantity means precisely a many in one, or a one in many. If, for example, we consider a quantity of anything, say a heap of wheat, this is, in the first place, one; it is one whole. Secondly, it is many, for it is composed of many parts. As one it is continuous; as many it is discrete. Now the true notion of quantity is not one, apart form many, nor many apart from one. It is the synthesis of both. It is a many in one. The antinomy we are considering arises from considering one side of the truth in a false abstraction from the other. To conceive unity as not being in itself multiplicity, or multiplicity as not being unity, is a false abstraction. The thought of the one involves the thought of the many, and the thought of the many involves the thought of the one. You cannot have a many without a one, any more than you can have one end of a stick without the other.
Now, if we consider anything which is
quantitatively measured, such as a straight line, we may consider
it, in the first place, as one. In that case it is a continuous
divisible unit. Next we may regard it as many, in which case it
falls into parts. Now each of these parts may again be regarded as
one, and as such is an indivisible unit; and again each part may
be regarded as many, in which case it falls into further parts;
and this alternating process may go on for ever. This is the view
of the matter which gives rise to Zeno's contradictions. But it is
a false view. It involves the false abstraction of first regarding
the many as something that has reality apart from the one, and
then regarding the one as something that has reality apart from
the many. If you persist in saying that the line is simply one and
not many, then there arises the theory of indivisible units. If
you persist in saying it is simply many and not one, then it is
divisible ad infinitum. But the truth is that it is neither
simply many nor simply one; it is a many in one, that is,
it is a quantity. Both sides of the contradiction are,
therefore, in one sense true, for each is a factor of the truth.
But both sides are also false, if and in so far as, each sets
itself up as the whole truth.
The Contemporary Solution to Zeno's Paradoxes.
Kant's, Hume's and Hegel's solutions to the paradoxes have been very stimulating to subsequent thinkers, but ultimately have not been accepted. There is now general agreement among mathematicians, physicists and philosophers of science on what revisions are necessary in order to escape the contradictions discovered by Zeno's fruitful paradoxes. The concepts of space, time, and motion have to be radically changed, and so do the mathematical concepts of line, number, measure, and sum of a series. Zeno's integers have to be replaced by the contemporary notion of real numbers. The new one-dimensional continuum, the standard model of the real numbers under their natural (less-than) order, is a radically different line than what Zeno was imagining. The new line is now the basis for the scientist's notion of distance in space and duration through time. The line is no longer a sum of points, as Zeno supposed, but a set-theoretic union of a non-denumerably infinite number of unit sets of points. Only in this way can we make sense of higher dimensional objects such as the one-dimensional line and the two-dimensional plane being composed of zero-dimensional points, for, as Zeno knew, a simple sum of even an infinity of zeros would never total more than zero. The points in a line are so densely packed that no point is next to any other point. Between any two there is a third, all the way 'down.' The infinity of points in the line is much larger than any infinity Zeno could have imagined. The non-denumerable infinity of real numbers (and thus of points in space and of events in time) is much larger than the merely denumerable infinity of integers. Also, the sum of an infinite series of numbers can now have a finite sum, unlike in Zeno's day. With all these changes, mathematicians and scientists can say that all of Zeno's arguments are based on what are now false assumptions and that no Zeno-like paradoxes can be created within modern math and science. Achilles catches his tortoise, the flying arrow moves, and it's possible to go to an infinite number of places in a finite time, without contradiction.
No single person can be credited with having
shown how to solve Zeno's paradoxes. There have been essential
contributions starting from the calculus of Newton and Leibniz and
ending at the beginning of the twentieth century with the
mathematical advances of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor,
Einstein, and Lebesque. Philosophically, the single greatest
contribution was to replace a reliance on what humans can imagine
with a reliance on creating logically consistent mathematical
concepts that can promote quantitative science.
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